The final report on the crash of Air France Flight 447 is giving ergonomics specialists food for thought. One area of particular focus has been the stall warning, which the report says the crew ignored.
British European Airways Flight 548
In its final report into the loss of an Air France Airbus A330 over the South Atlantic on June 1, 2009, French air accident investigation agency BEA (Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses) has managed to explain most–but not all–of the pitch-up inputs by the pilot who was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident during the last minutes of Air France Flight 447.
The French pilots’ union, SNPL, has withdrawn its participation in the ongoing investigation of Air France Flight 447 (AF447), the Airbus A330-200 that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean while en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009.
French air accident investigators have highlighted gaps in flight crew training and management in the latest report into the June 2009 crash of an Air France Airbus A330-200 on a flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.
French BEA accident investigators on May 27 released factual information they have found in reading data from Air France Flight 447’s recorders, in hope of quenching speculation about responsibilities in the accident. But the information exposed an intriguing sequence of actions in the cockpit.
In the June 2005 issue of AIN I wrote about a fully loaded British Airways 747 that was taking off from Los Angeles bound for London when one of its engines emitted a large fireball just after liftoff. I commented on the wisdom (or lack of wisdom) of proceeding on a 16-hour flight with one engine out and uncertainty about the extent of damage to the engine or the airframe.
An incident on May 4 this year in which a Hawker 800A lost more than 10,000 feet during a post-maintenance stall test underscores the potential risks of stalling swept-wing jets. The Hawker recovered after what the pilot said was a four- to five-g pullout.