The FAA yesterday released a final rule governing certification of transport-category (Part 25) airplanes for operation in icing conditions, effective October 9. In publishing the new rules, the FAA added new material to Part 25, Appendix C, the section that details the so-called icing envelope. The new Appendix C material, however, does not address the NTSB’s desire for the icing envelope to be expanded to include larger icing droplets.
Summer is almost upon us in the northern hemisphere, but the FAA is embroiled in two significant icing-related issues: a proposed new rule for when de-ice systems are activated and a new interpretation of the term “known icing.”
Comments are due today on an FAA draft letter of interpretation released April 3 on the meaning of the term “known icing conditions.” At press time, 82 comments had been filed, mainly by individuals.
The NTSB has published the final report on the Icing-related crash of a Cessna Citation 560 that stalled during approach to Runway 26R at Pueblo Memorial Airport on Feb. 16, 2005. The two pilots and six passengers were killed.
In an unusual policy step, the FAA sought comments last month on a draft letter of interpretation regarding the meaning of the term “known icing conditions,” used–but undefined–in the FARs.
An FAA draft letter of interpretation seeks public comment by May 3 on the meaning of the term “known icing conditions,” used–but undefined–in the FARs.
Every few years, a debate erupts about whether the phenomenon of ice bridging is real or something questionable that pilots discuss while hangar flying or warning of the dangers of flying in icing conditions. The issue recently resurfaced at an NTSB public meeting about the icing-related crash of a Cessna Citation 560 in Pueblo, Colo., on Feb. 16, 2005.
Cessna Citation 550, Fort Yukon, Alaska, Sept. 30, 2005–The NTSB has concluded that the University of North Dakota icing research jet accident was caused by the pilot’s improper use of anti-icing equipment during cruise, which resulted in ice ingestion into both engines and the complete loss of power. Factors were the icing conditions, inadequate crew resource management and failure to use a checklist.
Mitsubishi garnered top bragging rights in the most recent AIN product-support survey, and the biennial pilots’ review of proficiency (PROP) seminar series is one good reason why. How many manufacturers sponsor regular owner/operator safety seminars–let alone doing so for aircraft that went out of production almost two decades ago?
CESSNA 425 CONQUEST I, SAN JOSE, CALIF., MARCH 6, 2002–The NTSB concluded that the in-flight breakup of Conquest N444JV was caused “by the pilot’s loss of control, which resulted in exceeding of the design stress limits of the aircraft, leading to an in-flight structural failure.” The loss of control was blamed on the loss of primary airspeed reference resulting from pitot tube icing, caused by the internal failure of the pitot heat switch.