Stephen Hickok of Hickok & Associates, Orange Beach, Ala., announced on Thursday that the FAA performed a successful flight inspection on February 23 of the company’s design for the first helicopter simultaneous noninterfering (SNI) instrument approach in a complex airspace system.
The GPS approach is out, and the Rnav approach is in. That’s because many pilots tend to think of GPS as a land-based navaid like a VOR, NDB or as a part of an ILS, and experts believe that thinking is misleading. More precisely, it’s the FMS in the airplane that allows the actual instrument approach to be flown.
Switzerland’s Federal Bureau of Air Accident Investigation, known as the BFU, identified pilot error as the cause of a Crossair Avro RJ100 accident on Nov. 24, 2001, near Bassersdorf, Switzerland, during an approach to Zurich Airport. However, investigators also pointed to external deficiencies at other levels.
The Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau blamed insufficient pilot proficiency and repeated interference of a passenger occupying the cockpit right seat as the main causes of the crash of a Spanish Citation I/SP near Zurich Airport in April 2003. In the final report on the accident, examiners emphasized that a pilot flying a fast aircraft single-pilot must be particularly rigorous and systematic in structuring flight procedures.
The June 2003 fatal crash of a Bombardier CRJ100 operated by Brit Air (a subsidiary of Air France) near Brest airport in France, was caused mainly by the pilots’ forgetting to select the autopilot approach mode (appr) when they began their approach, according to the final report of the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA). The pilot was killed and five of the other 23 occupants of F-GRJS were injured in the accident.
In a landmark decision, the FAA has adopted a final rule allowing the use of HUD-based enhanced vision systems (EVS) for descent below published instrument approach minimums.
Chelton Flight Systems this month expects to issue a software revision to operators flying with the company’s FlightLogic synthetic-vision EFIS to fix a known anomaly that the FAA has said could provide misleading guidance under certain circumstances.
Mitsubishi MU-2B-60, Parker, Colo., Aug. 4, 2005–The NTSB blamed the accident on the commercial pilot’s failure to fly a stabilized instrument approach at night. Contributing factors were the dark night and low clouds, the inadequate design and function of the airport facility’s minimum safe altitude warning system (MSAW), and the FAA’s inadequate procedure for updating information to air traffic controllers.
Under an FAA cost-cutting proposal, certain ILS approaches, localizer-type directional aids, microwave landing systems and nondirectional beacons at some 25 U.S. airports would no longer be monitored by ATC or FSS due to their low annual activity or because they are not authorized for alternate airport filing when the control tower is closed. It will therefore be up to pilots to report signal discrepancies to the FAA.
Although the NTSB blamed the commercial pilot of a Mitsubishi MU-2 that crashed in Parker, Colo., in August 2005 for his failure to fly a stabilized instrument approach in IMC at night, factors cited by the NTSB included the “inadequate design and function” of the FAA’s minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) system and faulty FAA procedures.